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Recognized as a distinct subdiscipline of literary studies for about ten years 
now, ecocriticism (also referred to as studies in literature and the environment) 
is one of the newer theoretical-critical schools, although it originates in sixties 
environmental activism and texts such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) 
that catalyzed that movement. Ecocriticism is frequently seen as a logical devel-
opment out of the field of ecology. But if the term ecocriticism connotes atten-
tion to the relationship between written works and the nonhuman environment, 
the subdiscipline has now expanded well beyond this initial focus, which may 
explain the adoption of the more expansive subdisciplinary label studies in lit-
erature and the environment. 
As the shift in terminology indicates, ecocriticism’s identity is still in a for-
mative phase, and though indeed a rigid definition is to be avoided, some clear-
headed attention to its conflicting characteristics would improve the area’s 
methods and promote its aims. While ecocriticism presently enjoys an expand-
ing range of critical projects, it continues to exhibit a general animus toward 
theory and a consequent unwillingness to theorize epistemological and literary 
critical aims. Initially motivated by environmental concerns, ecocriticism might 
logically pursue an alliance with biology, but many ecocritics retain a postmod-
ernist suspicion of hard science. Therefore, many of the field’s assumptions 
about the relationship between cultural artifacts and the nonhuman environment 
have not been considered with much thoroughness, resulting in a habitual col-
lapse of the aesthetic onto the ethical and a celebration of potential incoherence 
in the guise of diversity and pluralism. 
Two important recent books, Glen A. Love’s Practical Ecocriticism: Lit-
erature, Biology, and the Environment and Dana Phillips’s The Truth of Ecol-
ogy: Nature, Culture, and Literature in America, call on ecocriticism to rethink 
its terms, attitudes, and engagement with science and with pragmatic thought. 
Both Love and Phillips are sensitive to the subdiscipline’s limitations as cur-
rently constituted, especially its animus toward normal science. Yet while both 
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of these scholars urge ecocriticism to expand its interdisciplinary engagement, 
their conclusions about how scientific insight is best applied to literary studies 
and what value traditional critical categories might have for ecocriticism are by 
no means similar. To varying degrees, both authors highlight some of ecocriti-
cism’s contradictory commitments and propose solutions to them, but perhaps 
more importantly, the two books together bring these contradictions into intel-
lectual focus and point to the need for their systematic address. 
Love’s Practical Ecocriticism is an impassioned appeal for practitioners to 
conjoin evolutionary theory with the ethical imperative of environmental criti-
cism. In the introduction, Love professes his exhiliaration at “[t]he present state 
of [the ecocritical] movement, . . . one of ferment and experimentation,” and 
modestly claims that his book “is a contribution to the mix” (5). Clearly, Love 
recognizes that a Darwinian perspective will affect this mix, but his is a call for 
unity in the name of ethical awareness and environmental action. Aiming to 
marry the text-centered approach of I. A. Richards to scientifically grounded 
arguments, Love proceeds here and in his first chapter to insist on a “nature-
endorsing” versus “nature-skeptical” epistemology, to claim that an evolutionar-
ily informed knowledge of human beings is central to averting ecological disas-
ter, and to champion a rethinking of the canon, “reading from an ecological 
rather than a narrowly human-centered perspective” (35). 
Biocultural critics like myself welcome this familiar soil, but a more sys-
tematic argument for a modified realist epistemology might make this chapter 
more persuasive to Darwin-skeptical literary critics. The epistemological argu-
ment could have been made on either bioevolutionary or pragmatic grounds (or 
both, since philosophical pragmatism was inspired significantly by the theory of 
natural selection); furthermore, in articulating his theory of knowledge, Love 
might have clarified the possibilities for broadening a “narrowly human-
centered” canon. Nor does Love explain why and how literature is especially 
crucial in raising consciousness about a distinctly nonliterary feature of actual-
ity, the nonhuman natural environment. 
In chapter 2, “Ecocriticism and Science,” Love constructs a strong argument 
for the centrality of evolutionary theory in ecocriticism. Anticipating the objec-
tions of fellow ecocritics in the chapter’s opening pages, Love relates the cost of 
humanist ignorance of science through a brief account of the Science Wars, the 
Sokal hoax, and the criticisms of humanist use and abuse of science tendered by 
Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt. Following this, Love explains the necessity of 
reductionism in science and asserts that methodological reduction in science is a 
valuable complement to the systems approach of ecology and ecocriticism. In 
his words, “Holistic thinking is necessary, even indispensable, but it must also 
anticipate all the eventualities of a complex system, for which reductionist tech-
niques may be required. Holistic or top-down thinking may thus depend for its 
advancement and refinement upon the ‘tinkering’ represented by reductionism 
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and the verifying techniques of the scientific method. As Duke University biol-
ogy professor Steven Vogel notes, while acknowledging the importance of how 
whole organisms work, ‘reductionism may not characterize all science, but it 
defines most of what we scientists do’” (43). In responding to accusations that 
methodological reduction is culturally biased, Love pointedly notes the partici-
pation of women scientists, including Darwinian feminists Sarah Blaffer Hrdy 
and Patricia Adair Gowaty, in its defense, thus distinguishing between biases 
that might appear in specific research programs and the fundamental method of 
investigation. Love concludes this initial portion of the chapter with the asser-
tion that “Antiscience has revealed itself as neither an intellectually defensible 
nor a politically effective stance” (46). As Love makes clear in this portion of 
his argument, both humanist disdain for science and misinterpretation of scien-
tific theories reveal the need for a more knowledgeable engagement with the 
sciences. 
In the remainder of this chapter, Love focuses specifically on the need for 
an ecocritical engagement with the life sciences, addressing the probable reasons 
for the neglect of biology and evolutionary theory among literary critics. As 
Love puts it, “despite the fact that evolution has progressed beyond classifica-
tion as theory to acceptance as fact by virtually all of the world’s reputable sci-
entists, as well as the informed lay community and even some religious leaders . 
. . it still strikes fear and loathing into the hearts of many humanists” (50). The 
reasons for uneasiness in the face of mounting evidence are several, according to 
Love: 1) residual fear of nineteenth-century abuses of evolutionary theory; 2) 
fear of one’s own ignorance; and 3) resistance to evolution’s hard truths, to 
“evidence that many would rather not hear” (51). Providing brief background on 
the development of evolutionary literary criticism (a development contempora-
neous with that of ecocriticism itself), Love concludes the chapter with a nod to 
E. O. Wilson who, though reviled for his claims about the biological basis of 
behavior, forwards a variety of hypotheses relevant to ecocriticism in particular 
and literary studies in general. 
Well-argued and authoritative, this is one of Love’s strongest chapters. He 
has read comprehensively in contemporary evolutionary theory and in the Two 
Cultures debates, and his knowledge of evolutionary literary criticism is consid-
erable as well. Love sensibly notes that if we wish to analyze human behaviors, 
such as the treatment of the environment and the production of literary texts, 
what science has discovered about these matters is of the greatest pertinence. 
From a logical point of view, this may seem like a simple point, but the burden 
of persuasion, as every evolutionary critic knows, is great. In anticipating all the 
concerns of his readers and in providing substantial research from the develop-
ment of evolutionary theory and contemporary research, Love compels his read-
ers to ask at what cost they ignore this expanding body of work.  
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In chapters 3-6, Love turns to more traditionally literary matters: an en-
dorsement of the pastoral mode followed by successive sections on three Ameri-
can authors, Willa Cather, Ernest Hemingway, and William Dean Howells. 
Thus, the core chapters of the book engage with the trickiest part of any inter-
disciplinary literary project, requiring that research or theory from extraliterary 
disciplines be linked with literary concepts and interpretation. In this endeavor, 
the critic must avoid reductive interpretation while still illustrating a meaningful 
link between the science and the literature. Love is most successful in negotiat-
ing this terrain in his discussion of the biophilia hypothesis in chapter 3 and in 
his application of that hypothesis to The Professor’s House in chapter 4. 
The biophilia hypothesis, first proposed by Wilson, states that, as living 
creatures, we have an affinity for the rest of the natural world, “a partly genetic 
‘sociobiological’ affiliation with other life and life processes” (76). Drawing on 
environmental psychology and behavioral ecology, Love notes that, from an 
evolutionary standpoint, biophilia must be weighed with the evidence for bio-
phobia, an equally adaptive disposition logically entailed by evolutionary the-
ory. In particular, Love elaborates the research suggesting that humans have a 
innate predisposition for certain types of landscape, thus inviting the reader to 
contemplate what Lawrence Buell has elsewhere called “the environmental un-
conscious” (though Buell takes care to avoid exactly the kind of bioevolutionary 
claims Love is here making). In chapter 4, Love deftly connects these hypothe-
ses, several other strands of extraliterary research, and Cather’s literary tech-
niques in the novel. Behavioral ecology submits that we have an innate (body-
mind) affinity for the physical environment, and the linguist-philosopher team of 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson claim that our mental concepts and language 
are derived from bodily experience; in turn, evolutionary theorists of the arts 
emphasize the fundamentally emotional appeal of the arts. Art is, in short, a 
product of the body in the mind, and Love ties this directly to Cather’s own re-
marks about the drive to write: “‘An artist has an emotion and the first thing he 
wants to do with it is to find form to put it in, a design. It reacts on him exactly 
as food makes a hungry person want to eat. It may tease him for years until he 
gets the right form of the emotion’” (Willa Cather in Person 79) (91). Noting as 
well the archetypal elements in Cather and combining traditional literary schol-
arship with the bioevolutionary analyses of Joseph Carroll and Robert Storey, 
Love stresses the need to focus on bodily senses and the perception of place in 
the novel. These features, in Love’s analysis, are related to the style and form of 
the novel. Explaining the disproportion in section lengths in the novel in terms 
of movement toward an increasingly primitive phenomenological state, Love 
observes that, in the last section, “Cather has carried the unfurnishing process 
almost to the point of having to renounce her medium,” thus anticipating He-
mingway’s minimalism (114). 
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In sum, Love impressively links a range of research to Cather’s literary 
method, offering a thoughtful reading of The Professor’s House. A scholar of a 
more theoretical bent might ultimately ponder the implications of the author’s 
final near-renunciation, her move against language. If this drive to renounce 
language is so intimately connected with the value of the text for ecocriticism—
and, indeed, moving outside, above, or beyond words is a frequent desideratum 
of ecocritical texts—then is there, finally, a conflicted feeling amongst ecocritics 
about the value of the objects they study? Some theoretical speculation of this 
kind might prove more conceptually useful than the traditional genres and 
modes (pastoral, tragedy, realism) that Love marries to his evolutionary readings 
here and in the remaining chapters. Admittedly, The Professor’s House provides 
a fine example of the renewed version of pastoral Love calls for in chapter 3—
provides it, that is, if we still feel that that mode has much definitional and con-
ceptual force in Love’s context. Of this, I’m not convinced. In Love’s account, 
the original Greek notion of pastoral acknowledged the connection between hu-
man and animal life and dealt with the reality of death, thus differing from the 
idealized versions that inform the core of English-language pastoral literature. 
But it is the idealized versions dating from the Renaissance that are likely to 
inform the thinking of Love’s readers, and thus the concept itself impedes rather 
than augments a physiological-ecological appreciation of the work at hand. It is 
the evolutionary and cognitive concepts here employed that illuminate the liter-
ary reading, a reading that the overdetermined concept of pastoral, defined here 
only as the mode that pairs “those grand narratives, nature and death,” is likely 
to obfuscate (83). 
These criticisms notwithstanding, the chapter on Cather exemplifies an eco-
critical reading following the method of much evolutionary criticism—applying 
evolutionary and cognitive hypotheses to textual interpretation. The chapters on 
Hemingway and Howells both adopt slightly different methods. Love notes that 
Hemingway combines a simultaneously loving and aggressive attitude toward 
nonhuman nature, mixing the conflicting modes of native primitivism and liter-
ary tragedy, and the method of the chapter, on the whole, follows biographical 
criticism. After a brief discussion of The Old Man and the Sea, the chapter ad-
dresses the attitudes of Hemingway and his sons toward hunting and offers a 
psychological explanation for Hemingway’s need to kill. Love’s ambivalence 
about Hemingway—he has said in his introduction that he doesn’t want to serve 
as an ecopoliceman, but it is a common and seductive pastime in the subdisci-
pline—stands somewhat in the way of treating Hemingway’s work in the light 
of evolutionary theory’s hard truth, the hardest one, I think, for the ecocritic: 
What are, from an adaptive perspective, the motivating forces behind human 
destructiveness? 
Here more than in the Cather chapter, a biased definition of a literary mode, 
in this case tragedy, interferes with evolutionary interpretation. Love is an ad-
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mirer of Joseph Meeker’s Comedy of Survival, which posits that comedy grows 
from biological circumstance and condemns tragedy for glorifying heroes who 
accept no boundaries in the pursuit of personal greatness, no price being too 
high for personal fulfillment (in Love 125). One might reasonably ask whether 
such a monolithic definition applies to any number of works categorized as 
tragedies (Medea? Hamlet? The Cenci?), but for the moment it serves to point 
out that the judgment against acts of individual will inhibits analysis of the hu-
man desire to control and triumph and even kill as a sign of agency. In this case, 
ethics interferes with both science and aesthetics. Interestingly, while Love 
wishes to wrest pastoral from idealism and romanticism (and, presumably, the 
Christian dimensions of these), he proposes no similar cleansing of tragedy, yet 
surely suffering and human will, contra Meeker, are integral to our biopsy-
chological circumstances. 
In his final chapter, Love discusses several lesser-known Howells novels, 
The Landlord at Lion’s Head and the futuristic Altrurian romances, and the 
methodology of this chapter leans toward the history of ideas. Specifically, Love 
opposes the nineteenth-century realist response to contemporaneous theories of 
evolution (exemplified by Landlord) to the idealized versions of Howells’s fu-
turist experiments. Like many of his contemporaries, Howells was more influ-
enced by Edmund Spenser’s progressivist vision of evolution than the more so-
ber (and apparently accurate) Darwinian theory of natural selection. I am not 
sure whether Love means to imply that visionary aesthetics should be judged in 
the light of scientific truth, but his concluding remarks suggest such a judgment: 
“Howells’s altruistic fiat was not based upon evolutionary thought or his obser-
vation of human character, but on a visionary rewriting of human nature in 
which cosmic optimism triumphed over the realist’s sharp sense of the probable.  
Howells’s evolutionism finds its major achievements not in the forced 
meliorism of the Altrurian romances, but in his courageous commitment, seen in 
his best realist fiction, to the comedy of survival and to the questionable com-
pensations of muddling through” (162). This chapter may be Love’s delicate 
way of urging his colleagues to contemplate evolution’s hard truths, and if he 
succeeds in this, he will have accomplished something significant; however, if, 
first, Love means to suggest that relative accuracy in the presentation of scien-
tific and social thought should serve as the predominant criterion for aesthetic 
evaluation, and if, second, he assumes that accurate accounts of intellectual de-
velopments are more likely to occur in the realist rather than other literary 
modes, he needs to inspect the consequences of such ideas for literary studies. 
On the one hand, much of the canon would end up in the wastebasket; on the 
other, the criteria for literary judgment having become increasingly literal, the 
need for imaginative literature might be obviated completely.  
In truth, these features of Love’s book are symptomatic of a general ten-
dency in literary studies since the seventies to conflate social and literary value 
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and then presume the desired values inhere in specific literary modes, and thus 
the resulting problems need to be addressed by a broad spectrum of critics. If, in 
this sense, Love’s book is to my mind not enough of a departure from reigning 
attitudes, his call for an evolutionary perspective within ecocriticism is revolu-
tionary and ground-breaking, and in pointing to the usefulness of behavioral 
ecology especially, he has illuminated a body of research of particular promise 
for ecocritics. In the different methods of his literary chapters, Love is, I suspect, 
trying to show a range of things that can be done from an evolutionarily in-
formed perspective, for he has intentionally chosen texts not typically selected 
for ecocritical treatment. Admirably, he has endeavored to avoid the reductive-
ness that has been a repeated source of disappointment in interdisciplinary liter-
ary criticism for nearly a hundred years. Love understands intuitively that creat-
ing paradigms for criticism from scientific models or specific concepts over-
looks the differences between disciplines and their goals and frequently results 
in a sameness in interpretation that is ultimately deadening. But some explana-
tion of this at the outset would clarify the book’s structure for the reader and 
invite more forthrightly a reasonable pluralism in evolutionary ecocriticism. 
If Practical Ecocriticism is a courageous and in some respects perplexing 
book, The Truth of Ecology shares these qualities, but it is the proverbial horse 
of a different color. Phillips is an apostate, whereas Love is a consensus-builder; 
Phillips exposes the weaknesses of ecocriticism’s most cherished categories, 
whereas Love incorporates pastoral and realism into his evolutionary interpreta-
tion. Two extraordinarily different minds are at work here; given this, it is strik-
ing that the books exhibit several similarities in their strengths and weaknesses. 
Noting the paucity of the nature-culture dichotomy in his opening remarks, 
Phillips proceeds with a critique of ecocriticism’s central figures and guiding 
assumptions, including the subdiscipline’s antitheoretical stance; its devotional-
ism; and its endorsement of pastoral and realism. These criticisms are long in 
coming, and Phillips constructs, both in this chapter and throughout the rest of 
the book, a major challenge to ecocriticism’s assumption about nature, the mind, 
and the relation of these to language as well as to the function of literary art, 
focusing on the work of two venerated figures, Lawrence Buell and Barry Lo-
pez. As Phillips puts it, “The scandal that alarms ecocritics of the realist stripe 
only arises if one assumes that the fictional dimension of literature . . . is some-
how the source of its faults. Only then will one seek to treat literature as nothing 
more than a kind of writing, and writing as no more than a form of bookkeep-
ing” (16). But even bookkeeping is a doomed enterprise, as Phillips explains: “If 
we don’t have the ‘kinds of minds’ enabling us to make copies of and represent 
‘the amazing variety’ of our environment fulsomely, it is very unlikely that the 
kinds of texts we create are going to be any more representational than our 
minds are” (15). In the second part of this chapter, Phillips further unsettles fac-
ile distinctions between nature and culture and assumptions about reality 
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through a discussion of hyperrealism as a postmodern phenomenon. Using Um-
berto Eco’s analysis of this phenomenon to great effect, Phillips suggests that 
perfected, abstracted representations of nature (trees on the computer screen-
saver or rhinoceros topiaries at the San Diego Zoo) derive from the same im-
pulse as the drive for pure representationalism, to wit: “the Absolute Fake is the 
offspring of a pastoral impulse” (23). Delightfully, Phillips pursues this argu-
ment to its logical conclusion, addressing the postmodern counterclaim that na-
ture is now irrelevant. Finally, Phillips calls on ecocritics to address the nature-
culture dichotomy by hybridizing their method, combining philosophy, theory, 
and scientific learning with a pragmatic stance: “By taking a more skeptical ap-
proach, ecocriticism might avoid the dilemma posed by the rejection of theory, 
on the one hand, as a needless abstraction, and by theory’s rejection, on the 
other hand, of nature as a mere social construct or, still worse, ‘gone for good’” 
(40). 
At the outset, then, Phillips addresses some of the same issues as Love, and 
likewise calls for a scientifically informed and pragmatic response. However, 
Phillips argues with just those ecocritical assumptions and concepts that Love 
intends to preserve and enrich with evolutionary criticism. In Phillips’s view, the 
conflict between values and intellectual work and the misapprehension of human 
cognition are embedded in the justifications ecocritics give for the techniques 
and modes they particularly value. Phillips relies on philosophy, philosophy of 
science, some philosophy of mind (primarily Dan Dennett), and selected evolu-
tionary theorists to support his claims here and throughout the rest of the book. 
Somewhat surprisingly, given his theoretical orientation, Phillips does not pro-
vide his own definition of pragmatism or a pragmatic theory of knowledge, both 
of which ground the modified scientific realism to which he apparently sub-
scribes. Such a definition would be especially useful, since Phillips occasionally 
relies on thinkers who lean toward radical skepticism (Rorty is not Dewey or 
James) and who promote antipragmatic notions of literature (such as the Barthe-
sian texte).  
If Phillips, like Love, might better establish some of his theoretical presup-
positions, his second chapter is nonetheless superb, illustrating the value of sci-
ence for literature, just as Love does in his second chapter. Phillips provides an 
excellent summary of the history of ecology as both concept and scientific sub-
discipline in “Ecology Then and Now.” Here, Phillips especially emphasizes the 
discrepancy between the popular conception of ecology and the scientific field: 
“The values to which ecology dedicated itself early on—especially balance, 
harmony, unity, and economy—are now seen as more or less unscientific, and 
hence as ‘utopian’ in the pejorative sense of the term” (42). It is, indeed, the 
value- rather than knowledge-driven nature of the field that sustains this gap and 
the animus toward science, as Phillips ably demonstrates in his discussion of the 
environmental historian David Worster. Although historians like Worster cling 
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to a holistic and organicist concept of the ecosystem, “the history of ecology has 
been one of discovering how much unlike an organism and just how nonobvious 
the natural world can be” (51). As early as 1899, Henry Chandler Cowles’s 
study of Michigan marshlands demonstrated the difficulty of seeing the phe-
nomenon as a harmonious whole. Phillips traces the history of ecology and the 
ecosystem concept from Stephen Forbes’s (1887) theatrical analogy through 
Eugene Odom’s borrowings from cybernetics, pointing to the field’s struggle “to 
divest itself of analogical, metaphorical, and mythological thinking” (58). Cy-
bernetics and systems science might have seemed, because issuing from the sci-
ences, like promising grounds on which to model the ecosystem, but the result-
ing logistic equation long taught in ecology courses proved an inadequate tool, 
for one simple reason: mathematical models do not accurately represent bioevo-
lutionary realities. A strong critic of the application of systems theory to bio-
logical domains, Paul Colinvaux explains the problematical notion of the food 
web, which “sees each individual as a channel at a crossroads through which 
food freely passes, but real individuals are in fact road-blocks through which 
food gets with difficulty” (65). As Phillips notes in the chapter’s conclusion, 
“Much of what has passed for ecological theory has been at odds with Darwin’s 
insight into the role of natural selection” (77). In the example just cited, for in-
stance, the individuals in the presumed web compete with one another for lim-
ited food rather than serving it to their fellows, and the proven outcome is that 
some, perhaps many, will die. 
In explaining so clearly the discrepancies between the concept and the sci-
entific findings of ecology, this chapter provides a powerful rationale for eco-
critics to enhance their knowledge of science, since ecocritics themselves have 
invested overwhelmingly in an idealistic-holistic notion of the ecosystem. The 
focus of the chapter on the history and critique of ecology proper rather than 
ecocriticism is one of its strengths, for Phillips presents facts and authoritative 
commentary that ecocritics should find hard to ignore. My one criticism of this 
chapter is that the discussion of Darwinian natural selection is unnecessarily 
brief. An extended discussion of how this theory has endured in the sciences 
would complement the theoretical discussion of ecology and its problematic 
terminology (environment, habitat, ecosystem); the two together would illustrate 
the value of scientific criteria of falsification and verifiability—the ecosystem 
losing credibility, Darwinian natural selection gaining it in light of increasing 
findings about the natural world. By contrast, the unified ecosystem, like the 
food web Colinvaux discredits, is only possible through the objectification of 
individuals and the mechanization of their place in a process.  
Chapter 3, “The Science Wars, Ecology, and the Left,” a critique of Science 
Studies, SSK, and the strong programme (the sociological turn in philosophy of 
science), is something of a digression from the book’s primary purpose and ar-
gument. Logically, the first part of this chapter, an argument against epistemo-
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logical nihilism and the postmodern assertion that power constructs knowledge, 
should precede chapter 2’s discussion of ecology as a concept, since claims for 
the possibility of knowledge provide the groundwork for the critique of the eco-
system. Whereas this epistemological argument might be of value earlier in the 
book, much of what follows it, a long critique of Critical Theory and its descen-
dents (Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcus, Merchant, and Ross) is unnecessary; the 
notion that science is grossly exploitative can be countered without a detailed 
challenge to each of these theorist’s arguments. Andrew Ross’s attack on 
Dawkins’s notion of the selfish gene is a waste of the Joker cards from which 
it’s constructed and, though we may enjoy watching Phillips raze this intellec-
tual Disneyland, the space taken in doing so breaks up the continuity of the 
book.  
Chapter 4, “Art for Earth’s Sake,” returns to the subject of ecocriticism’s 
antitheoretical bias and its connection to the realist stance that assumes the iden-
tity of natural phenomena and cultural artifacts. Much of this chapter incisively 
criticizes Meeker, John Elder, and Buell, tying their approval of presumably 
existentially accurate poetry to a particular notion of American identity. Noting 
that this value-driven approach to art derives from the Puritan tradition, Phillips 
challenges Buell, an eminent scholar of Transcendentalism, for perpetuating a 
tradition he should consciously avoid. When Phillips turns to Petersen’s Field 
Guide to Birds, a text Buell praises for its realism, he is in fine form, combining 
his own obvious knowledge of birds and birding with an explanation of how 
representational inaccuracy actually enhances the value of the text for birders by 
exaggerating especially relevant features. Similarly, like stylized images, the 
names of the birds are not representational, but instead highlight particular fea-
tures that set the animals apart from one another. This discussion of the Field 
Guide is an outstanding example of pragmatic criticism (in the Jamesian sense), 
bringing literary theory, philosophy of mind, real-world experience, and a spe-
cific text to bear on theoretical claims. 
Phillips’s challenge to Meeker’s Comedy of Survival is, from the point of 
view of a biocultural critic, less incisive than his inspection of Buell’s claims. 
Approvingly citing remarks by Richard Dawkins and Stephen Jay Gould that 
literature can’t be seen “in the light of evolution,” Phillips atypically accepts 
these summary dismissals without considering what types of analysis might fall 
within the beam of such a vague metaphor. David and Nanelle Barash’s recent 
Madame Bovary’s Ovaries briefly surveys literary works in the light of some of 
evolutionary psychology’s most familiar concepts, and the result is predictably 
superficial and crude. Ellen Dissanayake’s three books on the evolution of the 
arts, on the other hand, provide a nuanced functionalist account of how the arts 
might have emerged over the course of human evolution. Scholars now working 
in evolutionary literary criticism and theory adopt substantially different per-
spectives and methods, providing a variety of accounts of the purpose of litera-
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ture and the meaning of literary works. By contrast, hypothesizing that comedy 
as opposed to tragedy has a bioevolutionary basis, Meeker apparently sees in the 
light of his own favorite lamp; an evolutionary perspective would necessarily 
need to illuminate the existence and persistence of a range of literary subjects, 
modes, forms, and other features from a biocultural perspective. Thus, like other 
theorists of the arts who have made value judgments based on evolved predispo-
sitions, including Rudolph Arnheim and Morse Peckham, Meeker has borrowed 
selectively from evolutionary theory to bolster his preestablished preference and 
has failed to place his analysis within the logic of evolution’s scope, magnitude, 
and central implications. As a critic with an impressive theoretical and philoso-
phical turn of mind, Phillips should see that Meeker’s shortcomings don’t con-
stitute an argument against evolutionary criticism in general.  
Having made short work of ecocriticism’s central spokespersons as well as 
its assumptions about conventional literary modes, Phillips, in his final chapter, 
goes after the subgenre most beloved among eocritics, nature writing (nonfic-
tional prose essay). In contrast to those who praise the responsiveness of writers 
like Annie Dillard to their natural surroundings, Phillips finds her musing cen-
trally self-absorbed and locates the origin of her writing in the tradition of Brad-
street, Emerson, and Whitman, identifying the drive toward transcendence as 
their motivating force. Using E. O. Wilson as a source, Phillips notes the com-
parative unresponsiveness of humans to the nonhuman natural environment, 
asserting that nature writers should pointedly accept rather than obscure the di-
vide between human observer and external environment. In the chapter’s con-
clusion, he turns to John Dewey, who (like James and other nineteenth-century 
pragmatists) noted the fundamentally mediating and categorizing function of the 
human mind. 
Like the chapter on the history of ecology, this one, in its impressive analy-
sis of the American tradition of nature-as-the-self, calls for serious consideration 
from ecocritics. Phillips asks his readers to recognize that the features of naïve 
romanticism in writers like Dillard, Lopez, and Richard Nelson are symptoms of 
the thoroughly modern perception that we are severed from nature, noting that in 
Lopez the natural historian and the religious seeker often consort oddly with one 
another. Phillips’s epilogue, calling for “an offensive and picaresque ecocritic” 
who might police the borders of the wild, holds up A.R. Ammons and Wallace 
Stevens as potential figures of value for their insistence on inspecting mental 
and material constructions and boundaries and on pondering the grimier aspects 
of reality in defiance of art and the mind’s formalizing, aestheticizing biases. 
The Truth of Ecology is packed with insights, many of them brilliant. If I 
could wish for a little less packing in some places, a little more unpacking in 
others, I’m nevertheless heartened to learn that this book won the independent 
scholars award from The Modern Language Association of America in 2004. 
Although cautious in his use of evolutionary theory, Phillips consistently refers 
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to Darwin and Wilson as authoritative sources on the natural world. This cau-
tious insistence on the validity of Darwinism is part of the larger picture of a 
mind that judges ideas according to their perceived intellectual merit, thus doing 
the hard work of shaking literary theory’s self-righteousness and complacency. 
Practical Ecocriticism and The Truth of Ecology together urge a new initia-
tive for ecocritics to make responsible use of science to address a constellation 
of concerns: values and beliefs in the face of apparent knowledge; the usefulness 
of received literary categories in a new form of interdisciplinary study; the rela-
tionship of political action to academic inquiry. Neither Phillips nor Love ad-
dresses these matters in depth, nor do they agree on local issues, and that is why 
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